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ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Are appellants

claims barred by the doc-

trine of collateral estoppel?
2.

Can appellant recover a real estate commis-

sion on the theory of quantum meruit?
3.
commission

based

Is

appellant's

claim

for

a

real

estate

on an oral contract barred by §25-5-4(5).

Utah Code Annotated, as amended. Statute of Frauds?

STATUTES
In the following cases every agreement
shall be void unless such agreement, or
some note or memorandum thereof, is in
writing subscribed by the party to be
charged therewith:. . .
(5)
Every agreement authorizing or
employing an agent or broker to purchase or
sell real estate for compensation.
Section 25-5-4(5). Utah Code Annotated, as amended.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for breach of an oral contract for
a real estate commission and alternatively for quantum meruit
for services rendered in connection with the sale of the Monte
Vista Ranch.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On August

7, 1978. appellant

filed a Complaint in

Third District Court, alleging that he and Leland Fitzgerald
had

jointly purchased the assets of Monte Vista Ranch, Inc.

and that he was entitled to an accounting and judgment for his
share of the assets.

The theory of the original Complaint was

abandoned and appellant filed an Amended Complaint asking for
a sales commission on the transaction involved herein (R. at
154).
The matter went to trial before a jury to determine
whether appellant was entitled to a sales commission on the
transaction herein.

(R. at 154). The trial court's Instruc-

tion No. 8 to the jury provided in pertinent part ". . . the
Court

has ruled

December

7,

as a matter

1977

imposed

of

upon

law that the agreement of
defendant

(Fitzgerald)

the

liability for the real estate commission, if any, owed plaintiff

(appellant) upon this transaction."

-2-

(R. at 155).

The

jury returned a verdict against appellant, upon which judgment
was entered.

Appellant

appealed

from that

judgment

in Mel

Trimble Real Estate vs. Fitzgerald. 626 P.2d 453 (Utah. 1981).
a copy of which is attached to this brief marked Appendix A.
As part of that appeal, appellant challenged the trial court1s
Instruction

No.

8 quoted

above.

This

Court

affirmed

judgment and specifically upheld Instruction No. 8.

the

(R. at

153-155).
On May
seeking

to

14. 1982. appellant

recover

a sales

commenced

commission

from

transaction involved in its prior action.
appellant contained

two causes of action:

this

action

the very same

The Complaint of
(1) for an oral

contract for a real estate commission, and (2) realleging all
of the facts of the First Cause of Action and seeking recovery
on the theory of quantum meruit for services rendered in the
transaction. (R. at 1-4. Appellant's brief p. 7).
12. 1984. respondent

filed

based on four theories:

On April

its Motion for Summary Judgment

(1) Appellant cannot recover a real

estate commission on a theory of quantum meruit; (2) Appellant's

claim

for

a

real

estate

§25-5-4(5) Utah Code Annotated,

commission

is

barred

by

as amended, aka Statute of

Frauds; (3) Appellant's claim for a commission is barred by
the applicable

statute

of

limitations. §78-12-25 Utah Code

Annotated, as amended; and (4) Appellant's claim is barred by
the doctrine of collateral estoppel. (R. at 139-151).
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Respon-

dent's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted on August 31.
1984. on the grounds that appellant's claim was barred by the
applicable statute of limitations.
Appellant
1984.

appealed

that

(R. at 200-207).
judgment

on

September

25.

(R. at 213). During the course of that appeal the re-

spective counsel

for

the parties discovered

that the trial

court had inadvertantly used the wrong date for commencement
of the action in applying §78-12-25. Utah Code Annotated, as
amended.

On November

18. 1984. the parties

stipulated

dismissal of the appeal without prejudice (R. at 227).

to
The

case was resubmitted to the lower court on the remaining three
theories of respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment.

(R. at

226-229).

DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW
On June
granting
260-261).

17. 1985. the Court

respondents

Motion

for

entered

its

judgment

Summary Judgment.

(R. at

Appellant brings this matter before the Court on an

appeal of the lower court's grant of respondent's Motion for
Summary Judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts and circumstances from which this action
arises as alleged in appellant's Complaint are as follows:
Prior

to December.

1977. appellant

-4-

alleges Wallace

Ohran.

as

President

of Monte Vista

Ranch,

Inc.

(respondent

herein), orally agreed to pay appellant's agent. Cal Florence,
a 6% commission if he could find a purchsaer of the ranch on
terms acceptable

to respondent.

Pursuant

to said

agreement.

Cal Florence introduced Leland Fitzgerald to Ohran and through
the efforts of Cal Florence. Leland Fitzgerald. Wallace Ohran
and Howard Sherwood, as officers for Monte Vista Ranch. Inc..
entered

into an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer

dated December 7. 1977.

(R. at 2. 3 and 152). As admitted by

appellant

in its brief, the Earnest Money

terms

any

of

alleged

to Purchase

real

estate

did

commission.

not

list any

(Appellant's

brief p. 5 ) .
The only reference to any real estate commission in
that Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase is on line 22
which provides:

"Buyer

[Leland Fitzgerald] to be responsible

for all real estate commissions."

No other mention is made in

the agreement of any obligation to pay a commission or any of
the terms of the alleged
contemplated
chase was
that

their

(R. at 152).

by the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer

never

agreement,

entered

agreement.

completed

and

subsequent

the stockholders

The sale
to Pur-

to the signing of

of Monte Vista Ranch. Inc.

into an agreement dated May 18. 1978 for the sale of

stock to Leland Fitzgerald.

(R. at 3. 182-195).

Re-

spondent was not a party to the Stock Sale Agreement dated May
18. 1978 and did not receive any consideration or benefit from
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that transaction.

(R. at 182-195).

The Stock Sale Agreement

provides that none of the parties thereto has incurred any
obligation
sions.

for

any

real

estate

or other

brokerage

commis-

(R. at 189).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The same issue is presented

in this case that was

adjudicated adversely to appellant in Mel Trimble Real Estate
v. Fitzgerald, 626 P.2d 453 (Utah. 1981).

Under the doctrine

of collateral estoppel, appellant is barred from relitigating
that issue.

The lower court had a sufficient record before it

to determine that the identical issue was presented in this
case as was litigated in the prior action brought by appellant.

The Court

may

not

consider

any additional

evidence

offered for the first time by appellant on this appeal in its
attempts to attack the lower court's judgment.
Furthermore, as presented to the lower court, appellant cannot recover for any services rendered in the sale of
real estate under a theory of quantum meruit.

Neither can

appellant recover a commission on an oral contract for compensation for the sale of real estate by reason of §25-5-4(5).
Utah Code Annotated, as amended.

The alleged

"writings" or

"memorandum" of any alleged agreement for the payment of a
real

estate

commission

are

insufficient

Statute of Frauds.
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to

satisfy

Utah's

Therefore.

the

Court

should

affirm

the

judgment

entered by the lower court dismissing appellant's Complaint.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
APPELLANT IS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL
ESTOPPEL FROM BRINGING THIS ACTION
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the doctrine of
collateral estoppel as a form of res judicata.

In Richards v.

Hodson. 26 Utah 2d 113. 485 P.2d 1044 (1971). the Court set
forth the distinguishing features of collateral estoppel as
follows:
A form of res judicata applies to situations like this wherein issues which are
actually decided against a party in a prior
action may be relied upon by an opponent in
a later case as having been judicially
established.
This
doctrine.
known as
collateral
estoppel. differs
from
res
judicata not only in the fact that all
parties need not be the same in the two
actions, but also in the fact that the
estoppel applies only to issues actually
litigated and not to those which could have
been determined.
26 Utah 2d at 115.
The Court further clarified

the doctrine of colla-

teral estoppel in 1978 in Searle Bros, v. Searle. 588 P.2d 689
(Utah 1978).

In Searle Bros., the Court adopted a four part

test for application of collateral estoppel, namely:
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(1) Was the issue decided in the prior
adjudication identical with the one presented in the action in question?
(2) Was
merits?

there

a

final

judgment

on the

(3) Was the party against whom the plea is
asserted a party or in privity with a party
to the prior adjudication?
(4) Was the issue in the first case competently, fully, and fairly litigated?
Searle Bros, at 691.
See also Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 635 P.2d 417 (Utah,
1981), and Shaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah, 1983).

A. The Issue In This Action Is Identical To
The Issue Decided In Mel Trimble Real Estate
v. Fitzgerald
Appellant

claims

that

the

issue

involved

in

the

present action differs from the issue presented in Mel Trimble
Real Estate v. Fitzgerald
action, appellant

in two ways:

(1) in the prior

sought recovery of his claimed

commission

from the buyer, whereas in the present action he seeks recovery of the commission against the seller; and (2) respondent's defense of novation was not presented in the prior case.
The prior action brought by appellant fully adjudicated the issue of whether appellant was entitled to a commission on the sale of the Monte Vista Ranch.
Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzgerald

The Court in

set forth a complete

summary of the factual basis from which that action arose.
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Appellant

does not dispute that

this action and

action arise out of the same transaction.

its prior

In the Court's

Instruction No. 8 to the jury it stated:
. . . the court has ruled as a matter of
law that the agreement of December 7. 1977.
imposed upon defendant. (Fitzgerald) the
liability for the real estate commission,
if any. owed plaintiffs (appellant) upon
this transaction.
Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzgerald, at 455.
The

jury returned

a verdict against

the plaintiff

(appellant herein), which verdict was affirmed on appeal.

In

light of the instruction given the jury, the jury necessarily
must have found that appellant was not entitled to any commission

upon

this

transaction.

The

Court

had

directed a

ruling that if the jury found that appellant was entitled to a
commission from this transaction. Fitzgerald was liable for
that commission.

The jury determined that appellant was not

entitled to a commission on this transaction and returned a
verdict against appellant and in favor of Fitzgerald.
Appellant is precluded by the doctrine of collateral
estoppel from relitigating the issue of whether it is entitled
to a commission on the sale of the Monte Vista Ranch.

The

fact that appellant is asserting the claim against the seller
in this action whereas the prior suit was against the buyer
makes no difference in light of the actual determination made
by the jury in the prior action.

-9-

Appellant's

claim that the present action will in-

volve the issue of whether any acts of appellant constituted a
novation of any obligation for a commission is without merit.
The fact that

respondent

may have the defense of novation

available to it in the present action which was not litigated
in

the

prior

action

does

not

preclude

the application of

collateral estoppel to bar the claims of appellant.

Since the

previous litigation already determined that appellant is not
entitled to a commission on the transaction, the Court does
not need to reach the issue of whether respondent may have any
additional defenses not addressed by the prior suit.

B. The Prior Suit Was A Final Judgment On
The Merits
Appellant

does

not

dispute

that

the

resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
tried

on

its merits

against appellant.
Court

affirmed

the

before

a

Appellant

jury

that

prior

action

The action was

rendered

judgment

appealed that verdict and the

judgment

rendered

against

appellant.

Therefore, the second part of the test set forth in Searle
Bros, has been met.

C.
The Judgment In The Prior Action Is
Being Asserted Against The Same Party That
Was A Party To The Prior Adjudication
In this

action,

respondent

has asserted

the prior

judgment rendered against Mel Trimble Real Estate against the
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very same entity; namely, appellant. Mel Trimble Real Estate.
This action meets the third part of the Searle Bros, test.

D. Appellant Has Made No Claim That The
Prior Case Was Not Competently, Fully, And
Fairly Litigated
The final
whether

test

in applying

collateral

estoppel is

the prior action was competently, fully and fairly

litigated.

Appellant has made no claim that the prior case

was not competently,

fully and fairly litigated.

The same

counsel. Robert J. DeBry. represented appellant in both actions.
jury

The previous matter was tried in four days before a

and

appellant

was

given

full

opportunity

to present

witnesses on its behalf and cross-examine opposing witnesses.
Therefore, all of

the requirements

for application

of the

doctrine of collateral estoppel have been met and the lower
court

properly

applied

the doctrine

to bar appellant

from

relitigating this matter.

E. The Lower Court Had A Sufficient Record
Upon Which To Apply The Doctrine Of Collateral Estoppel
Appellant asserts that the lower court did not have
the entire record of the prior proceeding which precludes it
from applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
cites

Parrish

v.

Layton City Corp.. 542 P.2d

-11-

Appellant

1086

(Utah.

1975). and Searle Bros, v. Searle. in support of its claim
that the court must examine the entire record of the prior
proceeding in order to apply collateral estoppel.
Neither of the cases cited by appellant involved a
prior action that had been appealed with an official report of
the proceeding as in the case before the Court.

In Parrish v.

Layton City Corp.. the defendant merely asserted that a prior
action had been filed by the plaintiff therein and judgment
had

been rendered

in favor

of defendant.

No copy of the

pleadings or record from the prior action was before the Court
for it to apply the doctrine of res judicata.

Without any

evidence of the prior proceeding, the Supreme Court properly
ruled that the lower court did not have sufficient evidence
before it to apply the doctrine of res judicata.
In Searle Bros, v. Searle. the Court denied application of collateral estoppel on the grounds that there was no
privity between the parties in the prior action and the Searle
Brothers

involved

in the subsequent action.

The Court, in

dicta, went on to say that the only record of the prior proceeding before the Court were counsel's references to transcript of testimony from the prior action in their respective
memoranda

which

determination

was

that

not

a sufficient

the plaintiff's

record

to

sustain a

claim was barred

by the

doctrine of collateral estoppel.
In the present action, the lower court was cited to
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the official publication of the prior case and was furnished a
copy

of

said

case

(R.

at

153-155).

The

published

opinion

contains a complete discussion of the nature of the case, the
procedural background, the relevant facts, and the rulings and
instructions in question herein.

The published opinion was a

sufficient record upon which the Court could make a determination that appellant was collaterally estopped

from asserting

its claims herein.
Furthermore, appellant
vide

copies of

the record

suant to Rule 44(a) and
and Rule 902 and
felt

the

record

had

full opportunity

to pro-

from the previous proceeding pur-

(d). Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,

1005, Utah Rules of Evidence, if appellant
contained

in the

published

opinion was

in-

complete.

1.
Appellant
Cannot
Now
Submit
Additional Evidence To Avoid The Lower
Court's Judgment Of Dismissal
Appellant
his

brief

has submitted

which were

not

and referred

before

the

lower

to evidence in
court,

including

excerpts from prior briefs on appeal, pleadings from the prior
action, minutes from the prior trial, and unsupported
ments

about

the proceedings

in the prior

case.

It

stateis well

settled that evidence which was not offered in the lower court
cannot be considered on appeal.

In Pilcher v. State, 663 P.2d

450 (Utah, 1983), the Court held:

-13-

Furthermore, plaintiff's reliance on documents not found in the record is improper.
Matters not admitted in evidence before the
trier of fact will not be considered here
(citations omitted).
id- at 453.
See also Utah Dept. of Transportation v. Fuller, 603 P.2d 814
(Utah. 1979).
Appellant's

belated

attempts

to submit

evidence to

attack the verdict of the jury in Mel Trimble Real Estate v.
Fitzgerald as clearly shown in the published opinion should be
disregarded.

POINT II
APPELLANT CANNOT RECOVER FOR A REAL ESTATE COMMISSION
UNDER A THEORY OF QUANTUM MERUIT
Even if the Court finds that Appellant's claim is not
barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, appellant
cannot recover for a real estate commission on a theory of
quantum meruit.

In respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment

granted by the lower court, respondent presented four theories
upon

which

bringing

respondent

this action.

asserted
Appellant

appellant

was

barred

has only addressed

from

one of

those theories in its brief, namely collateral estoppel.
In appellant's Second Cause of Action, it attempts to
recover
meruit.

a real estate commission

on the theory of quantum

The Court has consistently ruled that a real estate

agent cannot recover a commission on the theory of quantum

-14-
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theory of quantum meruit and the First Cause of Action for a
real estate commission arose out of the very same transaction
and

occurrence.

The Court

should

not sanction appellant's

attempt to subvert the laws of Utah.
Furthermore, it is unlawful for appellant to transact
business as a broker-dealer or agent in the sale of securities
without

being

licensed

in accordance with the Utah Uniform

Securities Act and §61-1-3, Utah Code Annotated, as amended.
Appellant
licensed

did not allege or present any evidence
broker-dealer

even though respondent
Summary Judgment.
act

by ruling

or agent
raised

it was a

for the sale of securities

the

issue

in its Motion for

This Court should not condone an unlawful

that

appellant

is entitled

to recover

on a

theory of quantum meruit for the sale of securities.
Even if appellant was entitled

to recover under a

theory of quantum meruit for the sale of stock, respondent
could not be liable to appellant.
was

entered

holders.

into

by

Fitzgerald

Monte Vista Ranch.

and

Inc. did

Monte Vista Ranch. Inc. did not
sale.

The Stock Sale Agreement
the

individual

share-

not sell any stock.

receive anything

from the

Monte Vista Ranch. Inc. was not a party to the agree-

ment nor was it benefited

in any way by a transfer of its

stock between individuals.
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of
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t he
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case.

the r e -
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None of these

so called

"notes or memorandum" are

sufficient to meet the requirements of §25-5-4(5). Utah Code
Annotated, as amended.

As set forth in defendant's Motion for

Summary Judgment, the only reference to a real estate commission in the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase of
December 7. 1977 is at line 22 where it provides: "Buyer to be
responsible for all real estate commission."
The language of the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer
to Purchase does not constitute a sufficient writing to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.
have would

be on

The only effect it could possibly

the buyer under

seller. Monte Vista Ranch. Inc.

The

that agreement,

not the

Court has applied a very

strict standard for writings alleged to be a sufficient memorandum for an agreement for payment of a real estate commission.
In Case

v.

Ralph,

the Court,

in a very

detailed

analysis, outlined the requirements necessary to satisfy the
Statute of Frauds for a real estate commission.

The Court

interpreted §5817. Comp. Laws Utah 1917. which is identical to
the present statute cited above as follows:
Under such a statute a real estate broker
or agent cannot recover a commission for
services rendered in either selling or
procuring a purchaser for real property
unless it appears: (1) that there is an
express contract or agreement of authority
in which the terms and conditions of his
employment, if any, and the amount of his
commission, etc. are stated; (2) that such
contract be in writing; (3) that in the
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I. 1 n o t
evidence

pursuant to the Utah Rules of Evidence and Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
It is axiomatic that a party cannot oppose a Motion
for Summary Judgment by bare allegations unsupported by competent, admissible evidence.

Massey v. Utah Power & Light.

609 P.2d 937 (Utah. 1980); Franklin Financial v. New Empire
Development

Co.. 659 P.2d

1040

(Utah. 1983).

Without

any

evidence of any alleged in-Court admissions of the contract
terms properly before the lower court, it could not find that
an issue of fact existed on whether there was a sufficient
writing to overcome the Statute of Frauds.
In

its

Respondent's

Supplemental

Motion

for

Memorandum

Summary

in

Judgment,

Opposition
appellant

to

cites

Bentley v. Potter. 694 P.2d 617 (Utah. 1984). in support of
the proposition that an admission at trial of an oral contract
constitutes a waiver of the Statute of Frauds defense.

But

Bentley

of

the

"existence and all the essential terms of the contract".

Id.

v.

Potter

requires

an

admission

at

trial

at 621.
Even

if the Court

considered

the citations to the

transcript of the prior action as properly before the lower
court in order to establish an issue of fact, a reading of the
citations made by appellant makes it clear that the testimony
relied upon by appellant

does not establish the necessary,

essential elements of any contract alleged by appellant.
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The testimony, when read in context, clearly demonstrates that no contract for real estate commission was entered into as was determined at the prior trial of this matter
and upheld on appeal.

The Statute of Frauds is specifically

designed to avoid the fraud and difficulties of proof associated with establishing the terms of any alleged oral contracts.

The testimony relied on by appellant does not esta-

blish the essential elements of a contract or avoid the potential fraud and uncertainty in proving the terms.
Appellant

also

claims

that

performance

under

the

alleged oral contract takes it out of the Statute of Frauds.
In Case v. Ralph as cited above, the Court held that performance

or part

performance

estate commission would
Statute of Frauds.
was

sufficient

of a parol agreement

for a real

not bring the contract outside the

This Court has never held that performance

to take an oral contract for a real estate

commission outside the Statute of Frauds.
Therefore, the Court should affirm the dismissal of
appellant's Complaint as being barred by the Statute of Frauds.

CONCLUSION
Therefore, the Court should affirm the lower court's
judgment
stopped
appellant

on the
from

grounds

bringing

is barred

that

this

appellant

action,

or

is collaterally
alternatively,

e-

that

by §25-5-4(5), Utah Code Annotated, as
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APPEND]X A

MEL 1RIMIJLL REAL ESI AT L \
Che as, Utah, 626 P 2d 451

MEL TRIMBLE REAL EST A 11
i al Ho re nee, Plaintiffs iiml
Appellants,

1

\
b L t m l A I 11/(.MIAMI IMiiubuii
HMI Respondent.
No 1W46.
Supreme Court of Utah,
Feb 13, 1981.

Broker and sales agent brought attuni
against purchaser for real estate sales <nm
mission. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, Bryant H Croft, J., entered
judgment in favor of purchaser, and plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court, Harding, District Judge, held that: (1) in rase
in w hich earnest money agreement between
vendor and purchaser provided "Buyer to
be responsible for all real estate commissions," instruction given by the court fairly
and adequately covered the contentions of
the parties as they wen* presented to the
court, and there was no error in refusing to
give requested instruction on theory thai
broker was a third-party beneficiary in ear
nest money agreement, and (2) issues as to
sales commission claimed by broker and
whether there should have been any sales
commission at all were for the fury.
Affirmed.

1. Contracts <s=» 187(1)
1L is essential for a third-party bene fin a l ) claimant to prove that contract was
intended to benefit him directly; one incidentally benefited by performance of a
promise to a third person may not maintain
an action against the promissor.
2. Contracts <s=> 187(1)
T< rms of agreement and facts circumstances that surround its making can 1M
examined to determine whether supjHised
third-party beneficiary of contract was in
fact intended to IK* such.

1 Brokers c=»88<7)
In action against purt baser for real
estate sales commission in case in which
earnest money agreement between \endor
and purchaser provided "Buyer to be responsible for all real estate commissions,"
instruction given by the court fairly and
adequately covered the contentions of the
parties as they were presents! to the court,
and there was no error in refusing to i^w
requested instruction on theorv that broker
was .i third-part) k'neficiary in earnest
mone\ agreement
i Brokers <3=>88{1)
In action b) broker arid sales agent
against purchaser for real estate sales commission, issues as to sales commission
c laimed by broker and whether there should
t>e any sales commission at all were for the
JU1\

Rolxrt J DeBry arid Dale V (Jarduu r,
Salt Lakt City, for plaintiffs and ap|M 1lants
Lawrence fcl. Lorbndge, Salt Lake ( ity,
for defendant and respondent
HARDINl,, Dislnel Judge
This appeal is from an adverse judgment
on a claim for a real estate sales commission
Appellants w«ie HI I lie business oi selling
real estate
Mel Trimble was a licensed
M d estate broker, and Cal Florence was
i uiployed by Trimble as a sales agent. The
appellants will bo referred to herein jointly
as Florence
The ranch property involved in this action
is located in Cedar Valley, Utah, and was
under the management and control of Wal
lace Ohran Respondent Leland h Fitzgei
aid was a rancher
Two or three >ears prior to Decern bw
1977, Florence allegedly obtained an oral
listing from Ohran to sell the ranch property The terms of the oral listing allowed
Florence to seek offers, and if any offer
was accepted by Ohran, a six fiercent commission would be paid on the sale
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In October, 1977, through the efforts of
Florence, Fitzgerald became interested in a
part of the ranch and an offer was made to
Ohran. The offer was unacceptable to Ohran. About December 1, 1977, there was a
meeting of Ohran, Fitzgerald and Florence
in which Ohran told Fitzgerald he would
sell the ranch for $2,000,000, and that he
would pay the sales commission of six percent from the proceeds of the sale. During
the course of their discussion, Ohran said
that he would reduce the sale price of the
ranch to $1,875,000 if Fitzgerald would pay
the commission. Fitzgerald agreed to this
proposal. Nothing was put in writing at
this time.
On December 7, 1977, Ohran, Fitzgerald,
Florence and other interested persons met
in American Fork, Utah, in an effort to
effect a final sales agreement and to reduce
it to writing. Up to this time, there had
been no binding contract for a real estate
listing, a sales commission, nor for the sale
of any property. At this meeting, further
discussions ensued. A sales commission for
$125,000 to Florence was mentioned. Florence asked that there be two earnest money
agreements: one for Fitzgerald's part of
the ranch, and the other for Florence's part
of the ranch. Ohran said there would have
to be one entire sale. Fitzgerald and Florence retired to another room to discuss the
matter between themselves. The testimony
is conflicting as to what was discussed at
this private conference. About one-half
hour later, when they rejoined the others,
Fitzgerald said that he would take title to
the property and would take care of Florence.
Thereupon, an earnest money agreement
was made and executed between Monte
Vista Ranch, Inc. (Ohran's principal) and
Fitzgerald for the sale of the ranch for
$1,875,000. The agreement had a provision
stating, "Buyer to be responsible for all real
estate commissions." No further particulars were discussed at the meeting nor stated in the earnest money agreement with
respect to a real estate sales commission.
1. Kelly v Richards, 95 Utah 560, 83 P 2d 731
(1938). 129 A LR 164

Later that evening, Fitzgerald and Florence had a discussion concerning the purchase that had been made of the ranch, but
their testimony is conflicting as to any determination. However, Fitzgerald did give
Florence a check for $5,000. Their testimony is in conflict as to what the check was
for.
On August 7, 1978, appellant filed a complaint, alleging that he and Fitzgerald had
jointly purchased the assets of the Monte
Vista Ranch, Inc., that he was entitled to an
accounting, and demanded judgment for his
share of the assets. The theory upon which
the original complaint was based was later
abandoned, and an amended complaint was
filed praying for a sales commission in money only of $125,000. The case went to trial
with a jury on the latter theory. A verdict
against appellant was returned, upon which
judgment was entered. The court denied
appellant's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial.
[1,2] Appellant contends that the court
erred in failing to give a requested instruction, No. 23, on the specific theory that he
was a third-party beneficiary in the earnest
money agreement between the seller and
Fitzgerald, the buyer of the ranch property.
In this regard, it is essential for a third-party beneficiary claimant to prove that the
contract was intended to benefit him directly. One incidently benefited by the performance of a promise to a third person
may not maintain an action against the
promisor. The terms of the agreement and
the facts and circumstances that surrounded its making can be examined to determine whether the supposed beneficiary was
in fact intended to be such.1
The court gave Instruction No. 8, to
which appellant excepted. The portions of
this instruction relevant here are as follows:
The controversy centers around an earnest money receipt and offer to purchase
agreement dated December 7, 1977, by
which the corporate owner of the ranch
agreed to sell it to defendant for the
price stated therein. Among other

• tu *

I'tah

things, this agreement contains! a prm ision that defendant, Laland [sic] A Fitzgerald, as buyer was \o l>e responsible for
all real estate commissions
. . . the court \VA> ruled as a :..*.*- «
law that th*' aj^nvnenl of l)e<*eml>er 7.
1977, imposed uj>on defendant the liability for the real estate commission, if an
owed plaintiffs U*,M • ihis transaction
Normally, the amount of am such commission would have l>een as fixed by
agreement between the real estate salesman and the parties to the earnest money
agreement and should your determination
.from the evidence be that in this case
such was done and agreed to at the time
of the execution of that agreement, no
one could unilaterally change the agree
ment, and you should return your verdict
accordingly; but should your determina
tion be that while defendant agreed with
the seller to be responsible for all real
estate commissions at the time the agreement was signed, but that at that time
Cal Florence and Leland Fitzgerald were
still negotiating with each other with respect to the nature of the transaction as
H -tx^een themselves and how and in what
i
• am! in wha* amount any such
i
o be paid, you are ini
could between them•nakt an agreement thereon by
«*ach would be bound irrespective
of the intent or belief of the seller, and
once such agreement was made, neither
could change that agreement without the
consent of the other.
Thus, it is your responsibility to determine from the evidence what amount, if
any, is owed by defendant to plaintiffs.
The burden is upon the plaintiffs to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence the
basis for, and the amount of, their claim.
[3] After reading the transcript of the
trial proceedings, including the testimony of
the witnesses, and considering the theories
of the parties and the applicable law, we
think Instruction No. 8 fairly and adequately covered the contentions of the parties as
they were presented, to the court 'W e find
* CROCKETT, J., concurred in this case* before
his retirement, January 5, 1981.

n<i . " n - i r i ' 'Hg instruction N H, a; '
rtf-isuig to give appellants' req-H-ste.'
*;! m.-tion No. 23.
-. p K-l ants' assertion of *M > - i ....
in^ lo <\u ei i \ M d / i -f i u h i b u against
th< ovfenoanl is without merit, since then
uvrr sharp conflicts in the testimony on tin
*! ' :.e sales commission churned b\
* »,i.enee, or whether 'here sh 'd h,iw
l)een a sales commission d all
Tin-

<-,v. ,.,j ^ h o u - :uit

' h*

MT:

t o: . i.*,

jury *.e i i;ed on competent, relevant, and
admissil'1* evidence, that the trial judge
supported the verdict by us dtnia. of appellants* motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial; and
that "M accorded to the UiganLs a fair and
I '"
-.1. without prejudicial error,
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